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Climate Co-benefits of Tighter SO2 and NOx Regulations in China 
Kyung-Min Nam*†, Caleb J. Waugh*, Sergey Paltsev*, 
John M. Reilly*, and Valerie J. Karplus* 
Abstract 
Air pollution has been recognized as a significant problem in China. In its Twelfth Five Year Plan (FYP), 
China proposes to reduce SO2 and NOx emissions significantly, and here we investigate the cost of 
achieving those reductions and the implications of doing so for CO2 emissions. We extend the analysis 
through 2050, and either hold emissions policy targets at the level specified in the Twelfth FYP, or 
continue to reduce them gradually. We apply a computable general equilibrium model of the Chinese 
economy that includes a representation of pollution abatement derived from detailed assessment of 
abatement technology and costs. We find that China’s SO2 and NOx emissions control targets would have 
substantial effects on CO2 emissions leading to emissions savings far beyond those we estimate would be 
needed to meet its CO2 intensity targets. However, the cost of achieving and maintaining the pollution 
targets can be quite high given the growing economy. In fact, we find that the Twelfth FYP pollution 
targets can be met while still expanding the use of coal, but if they are, then there is a lock-in effect that 
makes it more costly to maintain or further reduce emissions. That is, if firms were to look ahead to 
tighter targets, they would make different technology choices in the near term, largely turning away from 
increased use of coal immediately.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
One of the consequences of China’s rapid economic growth has been increased emissions of 
sulfur dioxide (SO2), nitrogen oxides (NOx), and carbon dioxide (CO2), all strongly associated 
with rising fossil energy use. Emitted in the process of combusting fossil fuels with high sulfur 
content, SO2 is a cause of acid rain and a precursor to the formation of particulates, which are 
known to cause chronic and acute pulmonary and cardiovascular diseases (Pope and Dockery, 
2006). Also formed in the process of combustion, NOx contributes to acid rain and smog, and 
plays a key role in the formation of tropospheric ozone. The major source of SO2 emissions is 
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fossil fuel combustion at power plants and industrial facilities, while sources of NOx emissions 
include internal combustion engines in vehicles as well as combustion in electric power 
generation and industrial processes. CO2 is a byproduct of combustion of any carbon-based fuel. 
Rapid growth and heavy reliance on coal has made China the world’s largest emitter of CO2, 
recently surpassing the United States.
Targets developed as part of China’s Twelfth Five Year Plan (FYP) call for stricter air 
pollution controls. Slated to take effect at the start of 2012, the new regulations include SO2, NOx, 
soot, and for the first time, mercury. Our analysis focuses on the SO2 and NOx regulations and 
their interactions with CO2 emissions control targets. China’s official policy goals, specified in 
the Twelfth FYP, are to reduce emissions of SO2 by 8% and NOx by 10% (relative to 2010 levels) 
by 2015. According to officials, the new SO2 and NOx regulations require the domestic power-
generation sector alone to reduce 6.2 million metric tons (mmt) of SO2 and 5.8 mmt of NOx 
emissions by 2015 (Li, 2011). Compared with SO2 and NOx, China’s CO2 control target is 
relatively moderate, aiming at a 40–45% reduction of the 2005 CO2 intensity1 level by 2020 
(Copenhagen Accord, 2010). Given our projections of gross domestic production (GDP) growth, 
this intensity-based target can translate into an increase of total CO2 emissions of around 120%, 
from 4.4 billion metric tons (bmt) in 2005 to 9.6 bmt in 2020.  
In this study, we explore two questions: (1) How significant are the climate co-benefits from 
China’s official SO2 and NOx emission control targets, and (2) If these proposed policy targets 
are attained, how will China’s energy demand and supply structure change? To answer our 
questions, we develop a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model with technology-based 
parameterization of industry-specific pollution control abatement opportunities, and simulate it 
under multiple policy scenarios. The remainder of our study is structured as follows. The second 
section reviews the literature and describes the contribution of the present analysis. The third 
section provides detail on the methodology used, including the endogenous representation of 
pollution abatement cost. The fourth section presents the results of the analysis based on multiple 
policy scenarios. The last section summarizes our key findings and draws conclusions. 
2. SO2 AND NOx EMISSIONS CONTROLS IN CHINA 
China has had air pollution controls in place since 1987, starting with the Air Pollution 
Prevention and Control Law (Table 1). This regulation targeted SO2 primarily to address 
increasing acid rain, but did not cover power plant emissions. Coverage was expanded to include 
the power sector when the regulation was amended in 1995. In 1998, a regional control strategy 
was implemented. This strategy, known as the Two Control Zones policy, divided regulated 
areas into either the Acid Rain Control Zone, areas suffering from the effects of acid rain or the 
SO2 Control Zone, areas mainly responsible for SO2 emissions. These zones included 175 
prefectures across 27 provinces that accounted for 59% of the total SO2 emissions in 1995 (Hao 
et al., 2001). 
                                                 
1 CO2 intensity refers to CO2 emissions per unit of gross domestic product. 
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Table 1. Air Pollutant Emissions Regulation in China: Major Developments. 
Year Development 
1987 Air Pollution Prevention and Control Law (APPCL) implemented. This did not 
cover the power sector and areas affected by acid rain expanded (Qian and 
Zhang, 1998). 
1995 APPCL amended to cover the power sector (Hao et al., 2007). Shifted to a 
regional strategy, where priorities to improve air quality and prevent the 
spread of acid rain would be focused on. 
1998 Regional control strategy (the Two Control Zones policy) officially approved. 
2010 New regional air quality regulation (SO2) entered into force. 
2011 Twelfth FYP includes goals to reduce SO2 by 8% and NOx by 10%. Further, 
regulations call for a reduction of sulfur emissions from coal-fired power plants 
of 90%. Comprehensive NOx control is added to China’s air pollutant 
regulations for the first time. 
 
Several studies have measured China’s precursor emissions and industry progress towards 
meeting control requirements (Akimoto and Narita, 1994). SO2 emissions fell from an estimated 
23.7 mmt in 1995 to 20.0 mmt in 2000, and the percentage of non-compliant prefectures fell 
from 54% in 1995 to 21% in 2000 (He et al., 2002). Small mines producing high-sulfur coal had 
been closed, leading to an over 50 mmt reduction in high-sulfur coal production by the end of 
1999 (Hao et al., 2001). By the end of 2000, flue-gas desulfurization systems had been installed 
on 10,000 MW of power generation assets and a number of small, inefficient generation units 
had been shut down, reducing coal consumption by 10 mmt and SO2 emissions by 0.4 mmt 
(Yang et al., 2002).  
The impact of such changes in emissions and air pollution concentrations on human health 
(Matus et al., 2012) and infant mortality (Tanaka, 2010; Saikawa et al., 2009) was estimated to 
be substantial. Several studies have also extended their analysis to include the forecast of future 
air pollutant and GHG emissions under multiple policy scenarios and to estimate their impacts on 
the environment or on human health. Xing et al. (2011), for example, forecast emissions based 
on a bottom-up study of previous regulatory performance since 2005 and publicly announced 
provincial control strategies, and Saikawa et al. (2011) perform a scenario analysis of the impact 
of vehicle emissions on air quality.  
According to the recent SO2 and NOx emissions data, reported by China’s Ministry of 
Environmental Protection (MEP), SO2 emissions have been declining while NOx emissions have 
continued to rise (Figure 1). We take this up again in Section 4.1, as there is a growing 
discrepancy between China’s official statistics and estimates by independent research teams 
(Nielsen and Ho, 2007). If we accept the MEP statistics the SO2 emissions trend suggests that 
policy efforts have had some success.  
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Figure 1. Emissions and intensity trend in China, 2001–2010. Source: SO2 and NOx data 
from MEP (2011); CO2 data from World Bank (2012). 
The latest regulations that entered into force under the Twelfth FYP call for a further 8% 
reduction in SO2 emissions from 2010 levels and for the first time targets NOx emissions, calling 
for a 10% reduction by 2015 (China Climate Change Info-Net, 2011; Li, 2011). These tighter 
regulations, in effect as of January 1, 2012, will require that power producers adopt abatement 
technology or shut down the most inefficient plants. In addition to air pollution targets, China’s 
Twelfth FYP also includes economy-wide energy intensity and carbon intensity reduction targets 
of 16% and 17%, respectively. As shown in Figure 1, although CO2 emissions have increased 
rapidly since 2001, CO2 intensity first rose somewhat and then has declined slightly since 2006. 
This suggests that in China’s current or future settings, decreased CO2 intensity may not 
necessarily translate into reduced CO2 emissions. In recent years, China’s leaders have focused 
on reducing CO2 intensity as part of overall national policy on climate change. China’s 
Copenhagen commitment for addressing global climate change included reducing the energy 
intensity of the nation’s economy by 40–45% over the period 2005 to 2020. Similar to air 
pollution targets, responsibility for meeting the energy and carbon intensity targets is shared out 
among China’s provinces (China Climate Change Info-Net, 2011). Some of the strategies 
employed to meet air pollution targets may also help producers meet the energy and carbon goals, 
while other pollution control strategies may require energy to operate (e.g., fuel-gas 
desulfurization equipment) and could potentially conflict with energy saving goals.  
3. METHOD 
As described in detail by Waugh (2012), our method is built on the developments of Hyman 
et al. (2003), de Masin (2003), and Sarofim (2007). Our approach allows us to evaluate the cost 
of pollution controls within our CGE framework, incorporating bottom-up engineering data on 
pollution control costs. It differs from statistical methods (e.g., Selden and Song, 1994; Stern and 
Common, 2001) that have sought to estimate the relationship between pollution and development 
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following early observations of the existence of an environmental Kuznets curve. These 
approaches grew out of the observation that in early stages of economic development, pollution 
rose, but then as it continued, emissions peaked, and then fell.2 The robustness of this 
relationship has been questioned (Stern, 2004) but much follow-on work continued to estimate 
relationships between development (e.g., a GDP per capita or time-trend relationship) and 
pollution. Whatever the power of such relationships to predict future emission trends, they have 
limited application to analyzing policy that constrains emissions and seeks to determine 
compliance costs since costs are not accounted for in emission trends. Under a policy constraint, 
we expect the quantity of emissions and cost of policy compliance to vary, depending on the 
stringency of the policy and therefore pollution abatement costs must be represented 
endogenously. Our approach accounts for this by explicitly modeling the cost of abatement 
opportunities and the need for regulatory constraints to achieve them. 
3.1 Theoretical Framework: EPPA5 
We implement our methodology in the MIT Emissions Prediction and Policy Analysis model 
Version 5 (EPPA5). EPPA5 is a recursive dynamic, multiregional CGE model of the world 
economy, based on economic data from the Global Trade Analysis Project version 7 dataset 
(Narayanan and Walmsley, 2008) and emissions data from the Emissions Database for Global 
Atmospheric Research (EDGAR) model (van Aardenne et al., 2009). EPPA5 contains 16 global 
regions and 14 production sectors, along with additional technological detail in energy sectors 
(Figure 2). Further details of the model are described in Paltsev et al. (2005). One strength of 
EPPA5 is that it can easily be expanded for the analysis of various energy and environmental 
policies. For our analysis, we develop a pollution abatement module and integrate it into the 
standard version of EPPA5 to capture its interactions with other parts of the economy. 
 
Figure 2. Regional and sectoral aggregation schemes in EPPA5. 
                                                 
2 The original Kuznets curve was a relationship between development and income inequality where in early stages 
of development inequality increased and then later decreased as development proceeded. 
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For fuel related pollution, we represent precursor pollutant emissions (XE) and emissions 
abatement (XA) in the fuel-emissions bundle where (XF) is the fuel input (Figure 3). The 
relationship is a fixed proportion (Leontief) production structure. Absent emissions controls that 
set a price on emissions, each unit of fuel use is associated with a unit of emissions. The 
abatement-emissions sub-nest is a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) production structure 
with the elasticity (σfuel). The specification of production structures within the CGE framework 
uses expenditures to show the quantity of inputs. Thus, abatement XA is the capital cost of a unit 
of abatement. We assess the marginal cost of emissions abatement in the base year, and assign 
this value to both emissions and abatement (i.e. XA = MCA × xA and XE = MCA × xE, where lower 
case x’s are the physical quantities, MCA is the marginal cost of abatement, and the upper case 
X’s are quantities in value terms). Abatement is represented as additional investment and so 
increasing XA requires additional capital. The value of σfuel is estimated from engineering data, 
and allows for an increasing marginal cost of abatement. As in other parts of the model, we 
retain a supplemental accounting system that relates expenditures to the quantity of emissions.   
 
Figure 3. Fuel-emission bundle for fuel-related pollution. Pollution is used in fixed 
proportion to fuel consumed and pollution can come from either pollution emitted or 
pollution abated. 
The extent to which pollution is either emitted or abated depends on the stringency of 
emission controls and cost of abatement. In the absence of policy, the cost of emitting is zero and 
all pollution will be emitted. On the other hand, in the presence of emission controls emitting 
carries a cost. This creates an incentive to abate, and the overall pollution mix will shift away 
from emitting and toward abating until the marginal price for abating equals the marginal price 
for emitting. In the case that both emitting and abating costs are significant, this structure may 
lead to significant decrease in fuel consumption. In some cases, this may come through a shift 
away from more pollution-intensive fuels and toward less pollution-intensive fuels (e.g., 
substituting natural gas for coal to reduce SO2 emissions); or, in the case of exceptionally 
stringent emission controls, it may require a large reduction in energy consumption in the sector, 
which in turn would lead to a significant impact on the overall sectoral production output and 
eventually GDP. 
Pollution unrelated to fuel use is given as an input in the uppermost part of the production nest 
as illustrated in Figure 4. The rising marginal cost of abatement is determined by σPollutant, and in 
Fuel-Emission Bundle
(Fuel-related)
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all other ways the approach is identical to that for fuel-related emissions. At this position in the 
nest, abatement results in a proportional increase in all inputs, if all other prices are unchanged. 
We separately resolve SO2 and NOx emissions by sector and by fuel, and in any sector that has 
non-fuel related emissions. Thus, the initial marginal cost of abatement and the quantity of 
pollutant emissions is unique to the fuel source, sector, and pollutant. 
 
Figure 4. Non-fuel-related pollution represented as an input to production in the top nest of 
a CES production block. 
3.2 Marginal Abatement Cost Curves 
As noted above, abatement opportunities and costs are captured in the model through initial 
parameterization of cost shares and the relevant elasticities. Since abatement opportunities are 
entirely dependent on the specific abatement technologies available in individual regions and 
sectors, σfuel (or σPollutant) must reflect to the largest extent possible the technological detail unique 
to these levels of disaggregation. This is accomplished first by obtaining a price elasticity of 
supply for abatement from marginal abatement cost (MAC) curves for SO2 and NOx in each 
sector and region from detailed bottom-up engineering studies, and then relating the own-price 
elasticity of supply of abatement to σfuel (or σPollutant). In this manner, we are able to capture the 
“bottom-up” detail of the technology-specific abatement opportunities within the “top-down” 
framework of a general equilibrium model. 
We estimate the price elasticity and an intercept (P0) of the sector-specific MAC curve from a 
log-linear Poisson regression. Since the total quantity of pollution (XP) occurs in fixed proportion 
to fuel and since XP is the sum of XA and XE, any reduction in emitting must be made up by 
abating and vice versa. Therefore, the demand curve for emitting is the same as the supply curve 
for abating, and the price elasticities are also the same. The supply function for abatement is then 
given by Equation 1, where PE denotes the marginal price of emissions, and α and β are 
parameters to be estimated by the log-linear regression to the engineering data. 
( ) ( )ββ αα APEE XXPXPP −⋅+=⋅+= 00  (1) 
The above equation can be transformed into a log-linear form as shown in Equation 2. 
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(2) 
The price elasticity of demand for emissions (𝜀𝐷𝐸) can be drawn from Equation 2 by taking the 
partial derivative of the log-linear expression. As shown in Equation 3, 𝜀𝐷𝐸  is equal to the 
reciprocal of β. 
( )
( ) βε
1
log
log
=
∂
∂
=
E
E
D P
X
E
 (3) 
The relationship between this “own-price” elasticity and the elasticity of substitution in the 
CES nest shown in Figure 3 can be established from a cost minimization problem (CMP). 
Following standard economic theory, we consider a CMP where the firm seeks to minimize the 
cost of pollution production (CP) for a given output subject to the related production technology, 
given as a CES production function. If PA denotes the marginal price of abating, and PE the 
marginal price of emitting, then CP can be expressed as a function of XE and XA, as shown in 
Equation 4. 
AAEEP PXPXC +=
 
(4) 
We assume that the related pollution-production function is given as Equation 5, where γ, ϕ, and 
σ refer to the efficiency parameter, value share of emissions, and the elasticity of substitution 
between abating and polluting, respectively.   
( ) 1
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(5) 
Solving this CMP leads to the demand function for emitting given by Equation 6.  
σ
φγ
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XX  (6) 
From this, we solve for the price elasticity of demand by taking the partial derivative of XE and 
obtain Equation 7. 
E
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By Equations 4 and 7, Equation 8 can be derived. 
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Equation 8 can be further simplified at equilibrium, as firms in this state will be indifferent 
between emitting and abating, making PE equal to PA. This reduces the relationship further to the 
final form shown in Equation 9. 
  
%%1 AbatedEmitted
EE DD
εε
σ
−
=
−
−
=  (fuel-related emissions)    (9) 
From this, we see that for fuel related emissions, the elasticity of substitution can be estimated 
if the price elasticity of demand for emission and the initial percentage of total pollution abated 
can be determined. For non-fuel emissions, the relationship is similar except that we substitute 
between pollution emitted and other conventional inputs, instead of substituting between 
pollution abated and pollution emitted. Since the cost of conventional inputs will usually be 
much larger than the policy cost for pollution emitted, the value share for emitting for non-fuel 
related pollution is very small and for practical purposes can be neglected. The elasticity of 
substitution is therefore just the inverse of the price elasticity of demand for emitting: 
ED
εσ −=        (non-fuel-related emissions)    (10) 
To benchmark the elasticities of substitution and percent of pollution abated in our model for 
the base year 2004, we use technology cost and emission data generated by the baseline scenario 
of the Greenhouse Gas and Air Pollution Interactions and Synergies (GAINS) model which 
contains rich technological detail of abatement opportunities and costs (Nguyen et al., 2011). We 
then map the data generated by GAINS into the corresponding regions and sectors in EPPA. An 
example of the log-linear regression of Equation 2 for abatement opportunities identified by 
GAINS for reduction of SO2 from coal consumption used in electricity production in China is 
shown in Figure 5. 
 
Figure 5. Estimated MAC curve for SO2 from coal used in electricity production in China. 
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In the graph, the marginal cost per kg of SO2 abated is given in 2004 US$ which corresponds 
to the base year of EPPA5. According to GAINS, in 2005 15.61 Tg of SO2 was emitted from 
coal used in electricity production in China. Of the 15.61 Tg emitted, GAINS identified 
abatement opportunities from the available technologies for 13.49 Tg SO2, or 86% of current 
emissions. From the Poisson regression we find the value of the intercept parameter, P0, that 
optimizes the correlation coefficient to be $0.395 (2004 US$/kg SO2). This corresponds to an R² 
of 0.9975, giving a very good fit to the GAINS data. The full set of estimated parameters used to 
represent abatement costs of SO2 and NOx in our model are given in the Appendix. 
4. SIMULATION AND RESULTS 
We develop a baseline and multiple policy scenarios for the period between 2015 and 2050 for 
SO2, NOx, and CO2 emissions. Policy scenarios begin with the targets currently announced under 
the Twelfth FYP. We simulate these policies in the model and discuss the magnitude of the 
climate co-benefits achieved as well as the implications for sectoral energy use, electricity 
demand, technology, and welfare. 
4.1 Policy Scenarios 
To evaluate the potential co-benefits of air quality controls for carbon emissions reduction, we 
structure our analysis using one reference and seven policy scenarios (Table 2). The 
REFERENCE scenario is a business-as-usual scenario, which assumes that no further pollution 
or climate controls are imposed to reduce the SO2, NOx, and CO2 emission levels expected under 
existing regulations. 
Table 2. Reference and policy scenarios 
Scenario Brief Description 
REFERENCE • Business-as-usual scenario. 
• No policy constraints on SO2, NOx, and CO2 emissions are imposed. 
POLL_STR1 • Pollution-control-only scenario under the STR1 reduction schedule.  
• SO2 and NOx meet the 12th FYP goals for 2015 and continue a linear decline by 
8% and 10%, respectively, every five years through 2050. 
POLL_STR2 • Pollution-control-only scenario under the STR2 reduction schedule. 
• Ensures the same amount of accumulated SO2 and NOx emission reductions as 
POLL_STR1 does, but avoids early lock-in of investment in higher polluting 
technologies through pollution banking. 
POLL_MOD • Pollution-control-only scenario under the MOD reduction schedule. 
• SO2 and NOx meet the 12th FYP goals for 2015 and their emission caps are held 
constant through 2050. 
CLIMATE • Climate-control-only scenario. 
• Enforces a 17% reduction of CO2 intensity every five years through 2050. 
BOTH_STR1 • Pollution-climate-control-together scenario 
• Enforces POLL_STR1 and CLIMATE policy constraints at the same time. 
BOTH_STR2 • Pollution-climate-control-together scenario. 
• Enforces POLL_STR2 and CLIMATE policy constraints at the same time. 
BOTH_MOD • Pollution-climate-control-together scenario. 
• Enforces POLL_MOD and CLIMATE policy constraints at the same time. 
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Three out of the seven policy scenarios are pollution-control-only scenarios (indicated by the 
abbreviation POLL). POLL_STR1 places a “stringent” hard cap on SO2 and NOx emissions that 
requires 8% and 10% reductions of each pollutant, respectively, every five years through 2050, 
following the reduction trajectory established in the Twelfth FYP. POLL_STR2 achieves the 
same cumulative reductions in SO2 and NOx emissions as in POLL_STR1, but requires more 
stringent reductions in earlier periods and allows more emissions in later periods. This scenario 
simulates forward-looking behavior by recognizing that the economic agents optimizing over 
time would make different infrastructure and technology choices in earlier periods in anticipation 
of a large and costly future emissions reduction burden. POLL_MOD enforces more “moderate” 
policy targets than POLL_STR1 and POLL_STR2 by imposing post-2015 SO2 and NOx 
emissions caps fixed at their 2015 levels through 2050. 
The fourth policy scenario CLIMATE constrains CO2 emissions only, without enforcing 
emission caps on SO2 or NOx. For this scenario, we extend China’s climate control targets, as 
specified in the Twelfth FYP and announced in the Copenhagen Summit, and apply a 17% 
reduction of CO2 intensity every five years out to 2050. The other three policy scenarios, whose 
titles begin with BOTH, constrain both pollution and climate control targets by combining one of 
the three pollution-control-only scenarios with the CO2-control-only scenario. For example, 
BOTH_STR1 enforces the SO2 and NOx emission caps, described in POLL_STR1, and the CO2 
emissions caps in CLIMATE at the same time.   
With the existing statistics and the given assumptions for each scenario, we construct the SO2, 
NOx, and CO2 emissions reduction schedules by case, as shown in Table 3. Baseline air pollutant 
emissions inventories for EPPA5 are obtained by aggregating emission from the EDGAR-HTAP 
v1 dataset into EPPA5 regions and sectors (Waugh et al., 2011). However, there exists a 
substantial discrepancy between China’s baseline SO2 and NOx emission levels for 2010, used in 
this study, and Chinese official estimates reported by the MEP. In the case of SO2 emissions, this 
difference for 2010 is over 100%. For the purposes of this analysis, we use the estimates given in 
the EDGAR database rather than the MEP estimates, as the latter are consistently lower when 
compared with estimates by many other independent research teams (Nielsen and Ho, 2007). For 
example, Lu et al. (2010) found the 2000–2008 SO2 emission estimates reported by the MEP 
were biased downward by 10 to 30% when compared with their estimates. Similarly, Lin et al. 
(2010) arrive at estimates of China’s 2006 NOx emissions, which are 40% higher than 
comparable numbers from the MEP. 
The NOx and SO2 policy targets displayed in Table 3 reflect reductions that are quite 
significant relative to baseline levels but are necessary to address the substantial health and 
environmental externalities these pollutants impose (Figure 6). The 2050 emissions cap for SO2 
in STR1 (26.1 mmt) is comparable with China’s 2003 (23.4 mmt) or 2004 emissions level (27.3 
mmt) and is close to the level of emissions reported in the United States in 1985 (25.7 mmt) 
(EPA, 2012). Similarly, the 2050 NOx emission cap in STR1 (10.8 mmt) is no more stringent 
than 10.7 mmt, China’s 1994 level. China’s high dependence on coal for electricity generation 
and industrial use means that compliance will be quite costly but will also carry important and 
12 
substantial economic benefits. Previous studies have quantified the health effects from China’s 
air pollution. In 2005, for example, anthropogenic PM10 concentrations in China, whose primary 
contributors include NOx and SO2 emissions, caused around 3 million cases of premature deaths 
and over 8 million cases of non-fatal diseases, valued at around 4% of the national consumption 
level (Matus et al., 2012).  
Table 3. Annual emission caps by case (mmt), 2015–2050. 
 SO2 NOₓ CO2 
BASE STR1 STR2 MOD BASE STR1 STR2 MOD BASE POL 
2010 50.8 - - - 25.1 - - - 7,025 - 
2015 71.3 46.8 44.5 46.8 33.6 22.6 21.3 22.6 9,516 8,734 
2020 97.2 43.0 40.0 46.8 43.8 20.3 18.6 22.6 12,030 9,635 
2025 126.5 39.6 36.8 46.8 54.6 18.3 16.8 22.6 14,426 10,981 
2030 160.0 36.4 34.8 46.8 66.2 16.4 15.6 22.6 16,747 12,001 
2035 199.3 33.5 33.6 46.8 79.0 14.8 14.9 22.6 18,962 12,269 
2040 237.6 30.8 32.9 46.8 90.3 13.3 14.5 22.6 20,569 12,110 
2045 281.0 28.4 32.6 46.8 102.4 12.0 14.3 22.6 22,026 11,846 
2050 331.4 26.1 32.5 46.8 115.7 10.8 14.2 22.6 23,343 11,496 
BASE: Baseline case; STR1: Stringent case 1; STR2: Stringent case 2; MOD: Moderate case; 
POL: Policy case.  
 
Figure 6. China’s proposed emission schedules, extended from its historic levels, 1960–
2050: (a) SO2 and NOx, (b) CO2. Source: Historic SO₂ and NOx data from van Aardenne 
et al. (2009); Historic CO2 data from World Bank (2012). 
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4.2 Simulation Results 
In this section we introduce our central simulation results by topic. We focus on quantifying 
climate co-benefits, changes in industrial output, and changes in the composition of the 
electricity generation mix. 
4.2.1 Climate Co-benefit from SO2 and NOx Control 
We evaluate the co-benefits of pollutant regulation both in terms of reduced economic welfare 
and reduced CO2 emissions. Reduced compliance costs are computed by comparing emissions 
and costs when pollution and climate policies are implemented together relative to an approach 
in which each policy is modeled separately and the impact is added. We use the difference in the 
level of consumption as a measure of economic welfare, expressed as equivalent variation under 
each policy scenario relative to reference in constant 2004 U.S. dollars. The reduced CO2 
emissions are drawn from the comparison of baseline CO2 emission levels and CO2 emissions 
simulated under the pollution-control-only scenarios.  
Our simulation results show that climate co-benefits of pollution control can be substantial. 
Under the STR1 targets, the magnitude of consumption loss is estimated to increase from $3 
billion in 2015 (0.1% of the reference consumption level) to $586 billion in 2050 (5.1% of the 
reference consumption level) (Figure 7).3 Co-benefits under the STR2 or MOD targets are 
exactly the same as that under the STR1 targets, in absolute terms, as the CO2 emission reduction 
targets, specified in the CLIMATE scenario, are automatically achieved by complying with any 
of the POLL_STR1, POLL_STR2, and POLL_MOD emissions caps (Figure 8). In other words, 
in the STR1, STR2, or MOD cases, the co-benefits, measured as avoided consumption loss, equal 
the entire portion of the compliance costs required to meet the CLIMATE targets. When 
measured in terms of CO2 emissions reductions, the co-benefit under the POLL_STR1 and 
POLL_STR2 scenarios ranges between 1.5 bmt in 2015 and 21.5 bmt in 2050, showing an 
increasing tendency over time. The POLL_MOD scenario exhibits a similar magnitude of co-
benefits, increasing over time from 1.5 bmt in 2015 to 19.5 bmt in 2050.  
 
Figure 7. Policy compliance costs: (a) Under STR1 targets, (b) Under STR2 targets, (c) 
Under MOD targets. 
                                                 
3 Throughout our study, $ denotes 2004 constant U.S. dollars, unless mentioned otherwise. 
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Figure 8. Reduced fossil CO2 emissions by scenario. 
One interesting result is the compliance cost differentials between the STR1 and STR2 cases. 
As briefly mentioned in Section 4.1, the STR2 schedule ensures the same amount of total 
cumulative emissions reduction as STR1 does, but forces economic agents to reduce more 
emissions today while allowing them to emit more tomorrow, compared with STR1. The STR2 
schedule, a strategic inter-temporal redistribution of the pollution reduction targets described in 
STR1, is estimated to save substantial policy compliance costs involved in NOx and SO2 
emissions control in China. When compared with the POLL_STR1 case, for example, 
compliance costs under the POLL_STR2 scenario slightly increase by $10 billion to $70 billion 
in any given year between 2015 and 2030, but decrease much more significantly (by $19 billion 
to $941 billion) in the years between 2035 and 2050 (Figure 9). A simple sum over the periods 
shows $5.5 trillion of cumulative compliance-costs savings under POLL_STR2 during the entire 
period between 2010 and 2050, if linearity is assumed within each five-year interval. The 
corresponding net present value (NPV) cumulative savings were $298 billion, when evaluated in 
2010 with a discount rate of 4%. 
 
Figure 9. Economy-wide Cost Savings from STR2, Compared with STR1. 
This result coincides with our expectation, given that EPPA5, the basic platform of our 
methodology, is a recursive-dynamic model, where economic agents optimize their decisions in 
each period only. This myopic behavior may lead to a sub-optimal outcome from a long-term 
perspective, if there is an external shock to the economy in the future, such as pollution control. 
In other words, if more stringent regulations are anticipated, economically rational agents may 
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decide against investment in more coal use in the near term, even though adoption of control 
technology on coal may not cost much at present, because with tightening regulations over time 
the sunk coal investment makes it more costly to meet the regulations in the long-run. The 
possibility of such short-sighted (and ultimately inefficient) investment decisions under the 
recursive dynamic modeling structure can be reduced by reallocating some of the future 
reduction burden to earlier periods. This is because forcing them to undertake more stringent 
measures from the outset approximates forward-looking behavior (Gurgel et al., 2011). 
4.2.2 Impacts on Industrial Production 
The pollutant constraints that we model impose costs on the economy and result in reductions 
in output in most production sectors (Figure 10). In particular, proposed pollution control targets 
penalize energy-producing sectors, such as coal, refined oil, and electricity, and energy-intensive 
industries4 more than others in terms of total output. These sectors are all characterized by high 
emission factors, and their output decrease is driven primarily by a shift toward less-polluting 
substitute technologies and the high cost or limited availability of abatement technologies. In 
                                                 
4 Energy-intensive industries (EINT) in EPPA include the sectors that produce paper products, chemical products, 
ferrous and non-ferrous metals, metal products, and mineral products. 
 
Figure 10. % Change of total output by sector in China, 2015–2050, compared with the 
reference level: (a) POLL_STR1, (b) POLL_STR2, (c) POLL_MOD. 
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contrast, crude oil and gas, which are lower emitting substitutes for such pollution-intensive fuel 
stocks, see output expand. All of the three pollution-control-only scenarios present a similar 
picture (i.e. a large output decrease in coal, refined oil, electricity, and energy-intensive sectors, 
and a modest increase in crude oil and gas production), despite slight differences in the 
magnitude.  
The sectoral contributions to reductions vary across pollutants (Figure 11). The energy-
intensive industry and power-generation sectors account for a dominant share of the total 
emissions reductions, due to the large extent of coal use in these sectors. In the case of SO2 and 
NOx, energy-intensive industries contributed most to reductions, followed by the power-
 
Figure 11. Reduced emissions by sector, 2015–2050: (a)–(c) POLL_STR1, (d)–(f) 
POLL_STR2, (g)–(i) POLL_MOD. 
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generation sector. By contrast CO2 reductions occurred mostly in the power sector. Under the 
POLL_STR1 scenario, for example, over 70% of the total NOx and SO2 emission cuts are 
accounted for by the energy-intensive industrial sector, and up to a quarter of them are from the 
electricity sector. In contrast, over a half of the unintended CO2 emissions reduction, when the 
POLL_STR1 targets are attained, is from the power-generation sector, followed by the energy-
intensive industries, which are responsible for around 20% of the total CO2 reduction. 
Interestingly, the energy-intensive industries play an important role in pollutant emissions 
reduction, in contrast to other markets such as the United States where power generation has 
historically been the main source of NOx and SO2 emissions reductions. 
4.2.3 Impacts on Electricity Output 
The stringent NOx and SO2 emission controls have a significant impact on China’s electricity 
output mix, as such restrictions increasingly incentivize the deployment of less SO2, NOx, and 
carbon-intensive generation (Figure 12). The stringent pollution targets (STR1 and STR2) 
displace conventional coal-fired power generation in favor of cleaner alternatives, such as wind 
power with backup capacity5 and advanced nuclear.6 On a short time frame, however, this 
transition is expected to cause a large supply reduction between 2020 and 2045. This pattern also 
occurs under the POLL_MOD scenario, but its magnitude is much smaller. When only CO2 
emissions reduction targets are enforced under the CLIMATE scenario, no such reduction occurs, 
and instead, a smooth and gradual transition from conventional coal to coal with carbon capture 
and storage (CCS) takes place.7  
The primary reason for the large supply reduction under the proposed pollution targets is that 
the stringency of the pollution control would require capital stock turnover at a rate that exceeds 
the pace at which old generation can be retired and new, less emissions-intensive technologies 
can come online. The EPPA model parameterization of the life-cycle of power-generation 
infrastructure places some limits on the speed of change in the power-generation technology mix 
or of adopting new technologies, and the transition toward cleaner energy sources is determined 
largely by the interactions between old power-generation facilities retired from the market and 
capital available for new construction. This modeling strategy is to reflect the empirical 
observation that new technologies tend to penetrate the market gradually since local resources or 
capabilities required for immediate production at competitive costs or rapid market expansion are 
limited at the beginning (Jacoby et al., 2004). 
                                                 
5 EPPA5 includes two wind-related alternative technology options: wind power supplemented by natural gas (wind-
gas) and wind power supplemented by biomass (wind-biomass). The hybrid use of wind and gas/biomass is to 
allow wind turbines to remain in operation even when wind availability is not sufficient to operate them. 
6 We use the term advanced nuclear to refer to generation 3+ nuclear technologies, which are based on reprocessing 
or breeder-type fuel cycles.  
7 Carbon capture and storage (CCS) is not adopted in the pollution control scenario because, as modeled here, CCS 
does not reduce SO2 and NOx pollution. 
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Figure 12. Electricity output mix, 2010–2050: (a) REFERENCE, (b) POLL_STR1, (c) 
POLL_STR2, (d) POLL_MOD, (e) CLIMATE. 
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A comparison of the POLL_STR1 and POLL_STR2 cases presents an interesting result. In the 
POLL_STR1 case, conventional coal still remains in the market in 2045, while it is completely 
phased out from 2040 onwards in the POLL_STR2 case. We trace this peculiar result under 
POLL_STR1—the increase in coal use in 2045 after having disappeared in 2040—to the inability 
to reduce emissions in the industrial sectors because of the vintage capital structure in 2040, and 
then greater flexibility in 2045 that allows coal to briefly return in the power sector. This point 
demonstrates our “early lock-in versus forward-looking investment” hypothesis: early lock-in of 
capital investment in conventional coal-fired power plants may occur under the POLL_STR1 
case, while it is not as severe under POLL_STR2. In other words, assigning more stringent 
emission caps in earlier periods like POLL_STR2 simulates economic agents’ forward-looking 
behavior and advances the timing of investment in cleaner energy alternatives to conventional 
fossil fuel energy sources. This result suggests that if firms have advance notice of the long-term 
policy target and can plan ahead, they can significantly reduce future costs. Both POLL_STR1 
and POLL_STR2 are probably unrealistic policy scenarios because China is not likely to impose 
a policy that requires such a rapid transition of capital stock in a very short time. If sectors saw 
this trend and planned ahead for it, then the results in POLL_MOD would be more realistic. 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
We investigate the impact of SO2 and NOx emission controls in a modeling framework that 
endogenously represents pollutant abatement opportunities and costs. We find that even the 
moderate pollutant emissions constraint that we consider achieves CO2 emissions reductions that 
exceed China’s near term goals. However, to effectively address the air quality and health 
externalities caused by current pollution, a more stringent policy is needed—and the substantial 
associated costs can be mitigated if investment decisions early on take into account aggressive 
long-term reduction goals. 
Our analysis illustrates that pollutant emissions constraints are likely to achieve reductions in 
CO2 that exceed China’s current commitments by a significant margin. The current target of a 40 
to 45% reduction in CO2 intensity below 2005 levels by 2020, and its extension beyond 2020, is 
by many measures not a very stringent policy goal. It allows CO2 emissions to continue 
increasing, and according to many projections, would result from business-as-usual efficiency 
improvements not unlike trends observed in other parts of the world. Large cuts in China’s CO2 
and other greenhouse gas emissions are needed over the long term in order to achieve 
atmospheric concentrations consistent with long-term global climate stabilization. We estimate 
that if China achieves the SO2 and NOx emission reduction targets proposed in its Twelfth FYP, 
the associated climate co-benefit will reach $3 billion, in terms of saved compliance costs, or 1.4 
bmt of ancillary CO2 emission reductions in 2015 alone. However, all three of our SO2 and NOx 
control scenarios suggest that existing CO2 emissions controls are completely redundant. Several 
of the cost-effective abatement opportunities pursued under the SO2 and NOx policy, particularly 
fuel switching in electric power and to a lesser extent efficiencies realized in energy-intensive 
industries, achieve CO2 emissions reductions well in excess of those targeted by a policy that 
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achieves a 17% reduction in CO2 emissions intensity every five years. For example, complying 
with the SO2 and NOx reduction targets in the Twelfth FYP will lead to a 20% reduction of 
China’s economy-wide CO2 intensity (or a 13% increase of CO2 emissions) between 2010 and 
2015. Under the SO2 and NOx regulations, thus the CO2 control target in the same plan, aiming at 
a 17% intensity reduction (or a 14% emission increase), will not bind.  
Our sectoral analysis shows that China’s proposed SO2 and NOx emission targets will be 
achieved primarily at the expense of energy-intensive industries and the electric power sector. In 
particular, under the stringent SO2 and NOx emission reduction targets, China is projected to 
experience a large supply reduction in its domestic electricity market between 2020 and 2040. 
This is primarily because the phase-in of new advanced technologies needed to comply with an 
ever more stringent policy cannot proceed fast enough to fill the gap left by the phase-out of 
coal-fired power plants. Available abatement technologies for coal are not sufficient or not cost 
effective to meet the increasingly stringent target in the post-2020 time frame. Among the 
various backstop technologies, we find that wind-gas, wind-biomass, and advanced nuclear are 
the most cost-effective options to replace conventional coal-fired power generation, but the 
contribution of each depends on its relative costs. 
Finally, our results argue for policy measures that set forth clear long-term reduction goals, 
thereby discouraging the installation of new generation or incremental control technology that 
will be incapable of meeting an increasingly stringent target. Meeting the stringent pollution 
constraint we model here—which is consistent with China’s human health and environmental 
goals—will require substantial reductions in coal use in electricity and energy-intensive 
industries. If postponed to later periods through temporary fixes, reductions will prove extremely 
costly. Specifically, we find that China’s economy is expected to benefit from substantially 
reduced policy compliance costs under a reduction schedule that requires early action. This result 
underscores the importance of designing policy to incentivize forward-looking behavior—for 
instance, through banking-and-borrowing provisions—to avoid high costs in later periods.  
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APPENDIX 
 
Table A. Parameters used to benchmark SO2 abatement opportunities for China in EPPA. 
Sector Fuel Poll.  (Tg) 
Emis.  
(Tg) 
Abate. 
(Tg) 
Init. Price 
($/kg) εD θ σ α β R
2 
ELEC COAL 24.14 15.61 8.53 0.40 -0.25 0.65 0.71 30.03 -4.01 0.99 
ELEC OIL 0.03 0.03 0.00 1.88 -0.14 1.00 2.85 11.96 -7.02 0.88 
ELEC ROIL 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.48 -0.13 0.46 0.24 -36.16 -7.88 1.00 
EINT COAL 20.33 9.64 10.70 0.48 -0.45 0.47 0.85 19.68 -2.23 0.87 
EINT OIL 0.43 0.41 0.02 3.23 -0.13 1.00 2.53 35.93 -7.90 1.00 
EINT ROIL 0.12 0.11 0.01 1.51 -0.62 1.00 12.42 6.38 -1.61 1.00 
EINT PROCESS 6.77 2.90 3.87 0.22 -0.15 0.43 0.15 49.25 -6.88 0.91 
TRAN ROIL 0.40 0.36 0.04 1.96 -1.18 0.90 12.20 5.68 -0.85 0.80 
FORS PROCESS 0.14 0.13 0.01 0.39 -0.31 0.95 0.31 11.06 -3.27 1.00 
OIL PROCESS 0.20 0.15 0.05 0.16 -0.06 0.75 0.06 67.23 -17.70 0.93 
FD COAL 1.63 1.54 0.08 0.44 -0.13 1.00 2.56 50.91 -7.82 1.00 
 
Table B. Parameters used to benchmark NOx abatement opportunities for China in EPPA. 
Sector Fuel Poll.  (Tg) 
Emis.  
(Tg) 
Abate. 
(Tg) 
Init. Price 
($/kg) εD θ σ α β R
2 
ELEC COAL 5.58 4.52 1.07 0.12 -0.35 0.81 1.85 21.48 -2.82 0.59 
ELEC OIL 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.05 -0.29 1.00 5.82 7.30 -3.44 0.94 
ELEC ROIL 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.53 -0.13 1.00 2.54 -38.29 -7.88 1.00 
ELEC GAS 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.55 -0.13 1.00 2.54 14.73 -7.88 1.00 
EINT COAL 4.61 4.38 0.23 0.13 -0.26 1.00 5.21 30.11 -3.84 0.98 
EINT OIL 0.23 0.22 0.01 0.06 -0.29 1.00 5.81 15.75 -3.44 0.99 
EINT ROIL 0.22 0.21 0.01 0.15 -0.04 1.00 0.71 129.99 -28.23 0.72 
EINT GAS 0.07 0.06 0.00 0.09 -0.27 1.00 5.38 12.61 -3.71 1.00 
EINT BOIL 0.07 0.06 0.00 0.39 -0.13 1.00 2.54 24.90 -7.88 1.00 
EINT PROCESS 24.71 2.52 22.20 0.15 -0.14 0.10 0.14 48.49 -7.33 0.97 
OIL PROCESS 0.07 0.06 0.00 0.35 -0.07 1.00 0.07 44.26 -15.17 0.93 
FD ROIL 0.01 0.01 0.00 8.84 -0.26 1.00 5.11 9.77 -3.92 0.97 
FD GAS 0.01 0.01 0.00 4.92 -0.29 1.00 5.71 9.36 -3.50 1.00 
 
 
 
REPORT SERIES of the MIT Joint Program on the Science and Policy of Global Change
Contact the Joint Program Office to request a copy. The Report Series is distributed at no charge. 
FOR THE COMPLETE LIST OF JOINT PROGRAM REPORTS: 
http://globalchange.mit.edu/pubs/all-reports.php
189. Modeling the Global Water Resource System in an 
Integrated Assessment Modeling Framework: IGSM-
WRS Strzepek et al. September 2010
190. Climatology and Trends in the Forcing of the 
Stratospheric Zonal-Mean Flow Monier and Weare 
January 2011
191. Climatology and Trends in the Forcing of the 
Stratospheric Ozone Transport Monier and Weare 
January 2011
192. The Impact of Border Carbon Adjustments under 
Alternative Producer Responses Winchester February 
2011
193. What to Expect from Sectoral Trading: A U.S.-China 
Example Gavard et al. February 2011
194. General Equilibrium, Electricity Generation 
Technologies and the Cost of Carbon Abatement Lanz 
and Rausch February 2011
195. A Method for Calculating Reference 
Evapotranspiration on Daily Time Scales Farmer et al. 
February 2011
196. Health Damages from Air Pollution in China 
Matus et al. March 2011
197. The Prospects for Coal-to-Liquid Conversion: 
A General Equilibrium Analysis Chen et al. May 2011
198. The Impact of Climate Policy on U.S. Aviation 
Winchester et al. May 2011
199. Future Yield Growth: What Evidence from Historical 
Data Gitiaux et al. May 2011
200. A Strategy for a Global Observing System for 
Verification of National Greenhouse Gas Emissions 
Prinn et al. June 2011
201. Russia’s Natural Gas Export Potential up to 2050 
Paltsev July 2011
202. Distributional Impacts of Carbon Pricing: A General 
Equilibrium Approach with Micro-Data for Households 
Rausch et al. July 2011
203. Global Aerosol Health Impacts: Quantifying 
Uncertainties Selin et al. August 201
204. Implementation of a Cloud Radiative Adjustment 
Method to Change the Climate Sensitivity of CAM3 
Sokolov and Monier September 2011
205. Quantifying the Likelihood of Regional Climate 
Change:  A Hybridized Approach Schlosser et al. October 
2011
206. Process Modeling of Global Soil Nitrous Oxide 
Emissions Saikawa et al. October 2011
207. The Influence of Shale Gas on U.S. Energy and 
Environmental Policy Jacoby et al. November 2011
208. Influence of Air Quality Model Resolution on 
Uncertainty Associated with Health Impacts Thompson 
and Selin December 2011
209. Characterization of Wind Power Resource in the 
United States and its Intermittency Gunturu and 
Schlosser December 2011
210. Potential Direct and Indirect Effects of Global 
Cellulosic Biofuel Production on Greenhouse Gas 
Fluxes from Future Land-use Change Kicklighter et al. 
March 2012
211. Emissions Pricing to Stabilize Global Climate Bosetti et al.
March 2012
212. Effects of Nitrogen Limitation on Hydrological 
Processes in CLM4-CN Lee & Felzer March 2012
213. City-Size Distribution as a Function of Socio-economic 
Conditions: An Eclectic Approach to Down-scaling Global 
Population Nam & Reilly March 2012
214. CliCrop: a Crop Water-Stress and Irrigation Demand 
Model for an Integrated Global Assessment Modeling 
Approach Fant et al. April 2012       
215. The Role of China in Mitigating Climate Change  Paltsev 
et al. April 2012
216. Applying Engineering and Fleet Detail to Represent
Passenger Vehicle Transport in a Computable General 
Equilibrium Model Karplus et al. April 2012
217. Combining a New Vehicle Fuel Economy Standard with
a Cap-and-Trade Policy: Energy and Economic Impact in 
the United States Karplus et al. April 2012
218. Permafrost, Lakes, and Climate-Warming Methane 
Feedback: What is the Worst We Can Expect? Gao et al. May 
2012
219. Valuing Climate Impacts in Integrated Assessment
Models: The MIT IGSM Reilly et al. May 2012
220. Leakage from Sub-national Climate Initiatives: The Case 
of California Caron et al. May 2012
221. Green Growth and the Efficient Use of Natural Resources 
Reilly June 2012
222. Modeling Water Withdrawal and Consumption for 
Electricity Generation in the United States Strzepek et al. 
June 2012
223. An Integrated Assessment Framework for Uncertainty 
Studies in Global and Regional Climate Change: The MIT 
IGSM Monier et al. June 2012
224. Cap-and-Trade Climate Policies with Price-Regulated 
Industries: How Costly are Free Allowances? Lanz and 
Rausch July 2012.
225. Distributional and Efficiency Impacts of Clean and 
Renewable Energy Standards for Electricity Rausch and 
Mowers July 2012.
226. The Economic, Energy, and GHG Emissions Impacts of 
Proposed 2017–2025 Vehicle Fuel Economy Standards in 
the United States Karplus and Paltsev July 2012
227. Impacts of Land-Use and Biofuels Policy on Climate: 
Temperature and Localized Impacts Hallgren et al. August 
2012
228. Carbon Tax Revenue and the Budget Deficit: A Win-Win-
Win Solution? Sebastian Rausch and John Reilly August 2012
229. CLM-AG: An Agriculture Module for the Community 
Land Model version 3.5 Gueneau et al. September 2012
230. Quantifying Regional Economic Impacts of CO2
Intensity Targets in China Zhang et al. September 2012
231. The Future Energy and GHG Emissions Impact of 
Alternative Personal Transportation Pathways in China 
Kishimoto et al. September 2012
232. Will Economic Restructuring in China Reduce Trade-
Embodied CO2 Emissions? Qi et al. October 2012
233. Climate Co-benefits of Tighter SO2 and NOx Regulations 
in China Nam et al. October 2012
